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PARTIES
The names of all parties are contained in the caption of this Brief.
Hereinafter, this Brief refers to the parties as follows:
•

"Homeowner" refers jointly to the Appellants who were the
Defendants, Cross-Claimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs below.
The masculine pronoun is used in reference to the Homeowner
because, although Joan Hopkins was named in the complaint,
this was only because her name appeared on the title of the
home at issue. It was Lamar Hopkins ("Mr. Hopkins") who was
involved in the dealings with Rodger Uhrhahn and who was
present at trial.

•

"Uhrhahn Construction" refers jointly to Appellees Uhrhahn
Construction and Design, Inc., the Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant below, and to appellee Rodger Uhrhahn, the ThirdParty Defendant below. When Rodger Uhrhahn is referenced in
his individual capacity, he is referred to as "Mr. Uhrhahn."
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a(2)(j) (2004) gives the Utah Court of Appeals
jurisdiction over this appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Rules of Appellate Procedure permit an appellee to include a
statement of issues if dissatisfied with the appellant's statement. Utah R.
App. P. 24(b)(1)(2006). Uhrhahn Construction is dissatisfied with the issues
and standards presented in the Homeowner's Brief as follows:
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A.

Homeowner's Statement of Issue One:
1.

Framing of the Issue

The first issue on appeal is not appropriately framed in the
Homeowner's Brief. The first issue reads:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
INTERPRETED THE CONTRACT ASSOCIATED WITH
THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND WHETHER
THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS
SUPPORT
SUCH
AN
INTERPRETATION.
(Homeowner's App. Brf., p. 1).
Uhrhahn Construction is dissatisfied with this statement as framed
for two reasons. First, the statement assumes the existence of a single
contract ("the contract

associated with this case"). The major dispute at

trial was whether, as the Homeowner claimed, there was just one contract
comprised a set of written bid proposals and a change order, or whether, as
Uhrhahn Construction argued, both written and implied contracts
governed. The Trial Court determined the latter.
Second, although the Homeowner's statement of the first issue is
framed as challenging both the legal and factual findings of the Trial Court,
the issue actually challenges only the findings of fact.

Notably, the

Homeowner's arguments throughout his Brief go to allegedly erroneous
factual findings. (Homeowner's Brf., passim). Moreover, the Judge's legal
-2-

conclusions regarding the contractual issues naturally follow her findings
of fact on those issues.

See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and

Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah App. 1994) (finding that issues
characterized as legal challenges, truly disputed court's findings of fact
where court's legal determinations simply followed from factual findings).
Thus, the statement is more appropriately framed as follows:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT SUPPORTED ITS DETERMINATION THAT
VARIOUS CONTRACTS GOVERNED THIS CASE, AS
OPPOSED TO A SINGLE CONTRACT, AND/OR
WHETHER THOSE FINDINGS SUPPORTED THE
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SUCH CONTRACTS.
2.

Standard of Review

Uhrhahn Construction does not disagree with the Homeowner's
statement that a court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law
reviewed for correctness. (Homeowner's Brf., p. 1). However, that is not the
standard of review applicable here. Because the first issue truly challenges
only the Trial Court's factual findings, the standard of review applicable is
the clearly erroneous standard used to address a trial court's findings of
fact. More specifically, the clearly erroneous standard appellate courts
apply when scrutinizing findings of fact, "does not permit findings to be
overturned unless the great weight of evidence contradicts the findings."
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted).
-3-

The Homeowner also references Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in the standard of review section of issue one. (Homeowner's
App. Brf., p. 1). Although Rule 52(a) is not a standard of review, Uhrhahn
Construction does not dispute that the rule is applicable in this appeal.
B.

Homeowner's Statement of Issue Two:

Uhrhahn

Construction

disputes the

standard

of review

Homeowner argues is applicable to statement of issue two.

the
The

Homeowner's statement of the second issue reads:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED APPELLEES COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11
(UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE) WHEN IT
FAILED TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ITS AWARD.
Uhrhahn Construction is not dissatisfied with the language used in
framing issue number two.

However, the Homeowner states that the

applicable standard of review is that applied to a legal determination, when
issue two is again truly a challenge to the Trial Court's factual findings.
Therefore, for the same reasons outlined above, the clearly erroneous
standard discussed in Knickerbocker applies to the second issue. Also, as
stated above, although Uhrhahn Construction does not dispute the
applicability of U.R.C.P. 52(a), that rule is not a standard of review.
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C.

Insufficiency of Issues in General:

The issues presented in the Homeowner's Brief leave it unclear
whether or not he is appealing from the entire judgment because the issues
do not speak to the Homeowner's Counterclaim and Third-party claim for
wrongful lien.

The wrongful lien claim is statutory and the requisite

elements of the statute do not involve the contractual issues the
Homeowner raises, but instead go to the amount of the lien and the lienor's
intent, matters not raised in the Homeowner's statement of the issues.
Because the Homeowner's statement of issues and subsequent arguments
fail to address the wrongful lien claim, the Trial Court's ruling on the
wrongful lien Counterclaim and Third-party claim should be affirmed. See
Snow Flower Homeowner's Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207, |
14, 31 P.3d 576 (citation omitted) ("This court has routinely declined to
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal.").
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
The section of the Homeowner's Brief containing the controlling
statutes and rules does not cite to all relevant provisions of the Mechanic's
Lien Act. When looking at the Trial Court's rulings on the contractual
issues, the following provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act are controlling:
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1.

Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-2 (2002) 1 . "CONTRACTORS" AND

"SUBCONTRACTORS" DEFINED.
Any person who does work or furnishes materials by
contract, express or implied, with the owner, a s
provided in this chapter, shall be considered a n
original contractor, and all other p e r s o n s doing work
or furnishing materials shall be considered
subcontractors.
2.

Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-11 (2002). ENFORCEMENT - TIME FOR -

LIS PENDENS - ACTION FOR DEBT NOT AFFECTED - INSTRUCTIONS AND
FORM AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION.
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the
lien filed u n d e r this chapter within:
. . . (b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last
performed labor and services or last furnished
equipment or material for a residence, a s defined in
Section 38-11-102. . . .
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or
affect the right of any person to whom a debt may be
due for any work done or materials furnished to
maintain a personal action to recover the s a m e .
3.

Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-18 (2002), ATTORNEYS' FEES - OFFER

OF JUDGMENT.
(1) Except a s provided in Section 38-11-107 a n d in
subsection (2), in any action brought to enforce any
1

Plaintiff filed the lien at issue in 2002. Therefore, although the Mechanics'
Lien Act was amended in 2004, the trial was based on the statute in effect in
2002.
-6-

lien under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in
the action.
The following rules are also applicable to this appeal:
4.

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, BRIEFS.
. . . A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding.

5.

Rule 52. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2006), FINDINGS BY

THE COURT.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case came for trial on Uhrhahn Construction's claims of
foreclosure on a mechanics' lien and collection of a debt incurred by the
Homeowner, both based on written and implied contracts. The Homeowner
filed a Counterclaim against Uhrhahn Construction and a Third-party
Complaint against Mr. Uhrhahn personally, alleging breach of contract and
wrongful lien. The Homeowner's breach of contract claim was based on the
assertion that the bid proposals at issue, plus a written change order,
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constituted a binding, sum-certain contract which Uhrhahn Construction
breached.
Uhrhahn Construction and the Homeowner tried their cases on
separate days.

On the first day of trial, December 8, 2004, Uhrhahn

Construction presented its case. The Homeowner presented his case on the
second day of trial, April 26, 2005. The Trial Court found that the evidence
established Uhrhahn Construction provided labor, services and materials
to the Homeowner for the construction of his home ("the home") under both
written and implied contracts.

The Court further found that the

Homeowner failed and refused to pay substantial amounts owing under
such agreements.

Therefore, Uhrhahn Construction prevailed on the

mechanics' lien claim. The Trial Court also found that the same evidence
supported Uhrhahn Construction's alternate claim for collection of a debt
and that the evidence failed to support the Homeowner's Counterclaim and
Third-party claims. This appeal ensued.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the Homeowner has failed to marshal the evidence, Uhrhahn
Construction should not be forced to do so here.

(The arguments

supporting failure to marshal the evidence are briefed extensively below).
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However, out of a n a b u n d a n c e of caution, U h r h a h n Construction m a r s h a l s
the facts the Trial Court J u d g e found in support of h e r rulings: 2
A.

Contractual Issues

The following findings of fact are applicable to the contractual issues
raised in this appeal. Thus, these facts go to the Trial Court's decisions on:
•

U h r h a h n Construction's cause of action for a debt owed;

•

The portion of U h r h a h n Construction's m e c h a n i c s ' lien claim
based on contractual issues; and,

•

The Homeowner's Counterclaim a n d third-party claim for
breach of contract:

1.

U h r h a h n Construction provided labor, material a n d services to

the Homeowner, a substantial a m o u n t of which were b a s e d on written bid
proposals ("the proposals"). (R. 140).
2.

The proposals U h r h a h n Construction submitted were estimates

of how m u c h it would cost for partial construction of t h e home. (Add. to
Homeowner's Brf., p . 10; R. 135).

2

The facts contained in this section are taken from the "Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," the Trial Court's "Memorandum Decision," and Uhrhahn
Construction's "Closing Argument Brief." The propriety of incorporating
documents other than the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" is detailed
in the argument section of this Brief.
-9-

3.
Hopkins

After U h r h a h n Construction began working on the home, Mr.
m a d e frequent r e q u e s t s t h a t increased the scope of U h r h a h n

Construction's responsibilities. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10).
4.

The Homeowner's additional requests resulted in U h r h a h n

Construction taking on a n d completing a substantial a m o u n t of work
outside the original proposals. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10).
5.

The Homeowner should have known U h r h a h n Construction

expected to get paid for s u c h work. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 11).
6.

U h r h a h n Construction sent multiple itemized invoices to the

Homeowner outlining the additional work. (R. 141).
7.

The Homeowner paid for additional work detailed in the invoices,

including:
•

extra footings

•

h a n d excavation

•

extra power a n d water p u m p costs

•

increased concrete costs

•

extra water a n d sewer services

•

several other miscellaneous extras

(R. 141-42).
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8.

By agreement between the Homeowner a n d Mr. Uhrhahn,

U h r h a h n Construction did not complete certain portions of the framing,
electrical a n d plumbing originally contained in the proposals, and the
Homeowner w a s not billed for those portions. (R. 140).
9.

The Homeowner quit paying Uhrhahn construction for additional

work after disputes arose, particularly over Durisol block. (R. 141).
10.

During the bidding process, Mr. Hopkins r e q u e s t e d installation

of Durisol blocks r a t h e r t h a n s t a n d a r d cinder blocks. (Add. to Homeowner's
App. Brf., p. 15; R. 209).
11.

Mr. U h r h a h n informed Mr. Hopkins t h a t he h a d never installed

Durisol block before, only s t a n d a r d cinder block. (R. 135).
12.
block

Mr. Hopkins misrepresented to Mr. U h r h a h n t h a t the Durisol

would take only V2 the time to install a s cinder block.

(Add. to

Homeowner's Brf., p. 15; R. 209).
13.

Mr. U h r h a h n h a d no reason to believe Mr. Hopkins did not know

what he was talking about or t h a t Mr. Hopkins was misleading him. (R.
145).
14.

Based on Mr. Hopkins' representations, Mr. U h r h a h n went

ahead and bid the job for Durisol block because t h a t would m e a n Uhrhahn
Construction would also get the bid for rough framing. (R. 145).
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15.

U h r h a h n Construction did not supply the Durisol Block; the

Homeowner p u r c h a s e d it himself. (R. 141).
16.

The Durisol block was seriously deformed, causing added

difficulty with installation. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., pp. 10 and 15; R.
209).
17.

U h r h a h n Construction was required to dedicate m u c h more time

to installing the Durisol blocks on the home b e c a u s e they were deformed,
making the installation m u c h more difficult. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p.
10).
18.

Despite

the

additional

work

and

difficulties

Uhrhahn

Construction encountered, U h r h a h n Construction continued to perform its
work diligently a n d professionally. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 11).
B.

Damages

All items of d a m a g e s listed below are found in the Cost Review
Analysis Mr. U h r h a h n p r e p a r e d at the r e q u e s t of Mr. Hopkins and his
architect. (R. 164-187). In addition, these d a m a g e s are also detailed in
U h r h a h n Construction's Closing Argument Brief, including a statement of
evidence presented for each.

(R. 146-150). Specifically, the Trial Court

found the following facts in support of the principal damage award, based
on the combination of written and implied contracts:
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19.

The original bid proposals totaled $74,023.00. (R. 146).

20.

Invoices for the total work U h r h a h n Construction completed on

the home came to $100,645.22. (R. 146).
21.

In addition, the Court found t h a t the Homeowner owed U h r h a h n

Construction additional a m o u n t s as follows:
a.

Based

on

Mr.

Hopkins' misrepresentations

to

Mr.

U h r h a h n , a s well a s the Cost Review Analysis, U h r h a h n Construction
was owed a n additional $8161.99. (R. 147).
b.

Based on the Cost Review Analysis, the Homeowner owed

U h r h a h n Construction an additional $1,457.09 for footing work. (R.
147).
c.

Due

to the

problems with

the

Durisol

block,

the

Homeowner owed U h r h a h n Construction a n additional $900.00 for
steel angles over windows and rough framing of the sub-floor.

(R.

147).
d.

The

Cost

Review Analysis

evidenced

an

additional

$1712.50 owed for back fill, construction of a retaining wall and
earthwork. (R. 148).
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e.

U h r h a h n Construction paid $ 2 6 0 3 . 4 3 to satisfy a lien filed

by Butterfield Lumber for materials Mr. Hopkins charged to U h r h a h n
Construction's account without Mr. U h r h a h n ' s permission. (R. 149).
f.

The gross a m o u n t owing was reduced based on the

following credits:
•

$157.50 credit discovered during the Cost Review
Analysis for foundation a n d footing items;

•

$ 6 . 0 3 credit for concrete supplies;

•

$ 6 6 8 . 0 0 credit for electrical work;
$1457.09 credit for footing work;

•

$2,920.00 credit for additional cost for a framer,
Matt Collett, to complete framing to fit the Durisol
block; and,

•

$47,882.22, the a m o u n t
U h r h a h n Construction.

the

Homeowner

paid

(R. 148-49).
22.

Based on the facts identified in p a r a g r a p h s 19 through 21

above, the Trial Court found the principal a m o u n t of damages totaled
$62,386.29. (R. 150).
23.

Damage s u m m a r i e s presented by the Homeowner failed to

establish t h a t he suffered any damages. (R. 150).
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24.

The Homeowner presented no witnesses, other t h a n himself, to

establish his alleged damages. (R. 150).
25.

The Homeowner failed to produce any cancelled checks to prove

his alleged damages. (R. 150).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON ALL CONTRACTUAL ISSUES, AS
WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE
HOMEOWNER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON
THOSE ISSUES
A.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Sufficient Regarding the
Contractual Issues on Appeal

B.

The Trial Court Entered Sufficient Findings Regarding the
Principal Amount of Damages Owing to U h r h a h n
Construction

C.

The Trial Court's Findings That the Homeowner Failed to
Provide Support for His Alleged Damages Should Be Presumed
Valid

D.

The Homeowner Should Not Be Permitted to Marshal the
Evidence in His Reply Brief

BASED ON THE VALID FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT RELIED, THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
UHRHAHN CONSTRUCTION'S RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER
CONTRACTUAL THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
A.

U h r h a h n Construction
Contracts

Completed

B.

U h r h a h n Construction Completed Work P u r s u a n t to Implied
Agreements
-15-

Work

under

Express

III.

REMAND IS APPROPRIATE REGARDING THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ACT

IV.

PLAINTIFF PROPERLY FILED AN ALTERNATE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR COLLECTION OF A DEBT

V.

THE HOMEOWNER PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR BREACH
OF CONTRACT

VI.

THE COURT'S RULING DENYING THE HOMEOWNER'S WRONGFUL
LIEN CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
ARGUMENTS

I.

THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON ALL CONTRACTUAL ISSUES, AS
WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE
HOMEOWNER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON
THOSE ISSUES
The Homeowner h a s failed to m a r s h a l the evidence regarding the

contractual theories underlying the Complaint, Counterclaim a n d ThirdParty Claims.

The Homeowner h a s also failed to m e e t his marshaling

b u r d e n regarding the principal a m o u n t of damages. T h u s , the Court should
a s s u m e the sufficiency of the findings of fact on those i s s u e s .
The Homeowner correctly notes t h a t the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provide t h a t a court "shall find the facts specially a n d state separately its
conclusions of law therefrom.

(Homeowner's Brf., p. 15, citing U.R.C.P.

52(a)). However, before a n appellant can appropriately challenge factual
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findings he m u s t first m a r s h a l the evidence in s u p p o r t of those findings.
On this point, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that
. . . [a] party challenging a fact finding m u s t first
m a r s h a l all record evidence t h a t s u p p o r t s the
challenged finding.
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). The duty to m a r s h a l is a heavy b u r d e n , requiring the
appellant to first m a r s h a l all evidence supporting the court's findings, and
then show why the findings are flawed. Oneida/SLIC,

872 P.2d at 1052-53.

In Oneida, this Court discussed the marshaling requirement at length,
stating:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial c o u r t s '
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth
the heavy b u r d e n appellants m u s t b e a r when
challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal
a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel
m u s t play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] m u s t
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and
fully a s s u m e the adversary's position. In order to
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . ., the
challenger m u s t present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very finding
the appellant r e s i s t s /
Id. (Citations omitted) (brackets, elipses a n d e m p h a s i s in original). Once an
appellant h a s established every last fact supporting the adversary's
position, he m u s t t h e n "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and
demonstrate why the facts the trial court found fail to support its ruling.
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Id. at 1053 (citation omitted).

In other words, the appellant, after

exhaustively detailing every fact upon which the court relied, must then
show that those findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous." Id.
(citations omitted). When the appellant has not properly discharged the
duty to marshal the evidence, "[appellate courts] refuse to consider the
merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Id.
(citation omitted).
The only rare exception to the marshaling requirement is if the
appellant can show that the trial court's findings as framed are legally
insufficient, i.e., the findings do not provide enough detail to demonstrate
the evidentiary basis for the decision thereby allowing for meaningful
review. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995) (citation
omitted). However, even then, findings of fact are sufficient if they in most
respects conform to the pleadings, even though the facts may be very
general. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). See also
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah App. 1989).
A.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Valid Regarding the
Contractual Issues on Appeal

Despite the Homeowner's contention, the Trial Court entered more
than sufficient findings of fact regarding the contractual issues. In addition
-18-

to the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law/' the Court drafted a
"Memorandum Decision" outlining facts and incorporating Uhrhahn
Construction's Closing Argument Brief ("Uhrhahn's

Closing Brief),

containing even more factual statements. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., pp.
9-13).

The Homeowner's Brief does not contain the facts found from

Uhrhahn's Closing Brief, rather, the Homeowner inappropriately provides
only 7 selected facts related to the contractual issues on appeal.
(Homeowner's Brf., pp. 4-5, If 1-7). See Oneida/'SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053
(appellant's presentation of only selected facts in support of its arguments
failed to satisfy marshaling requirement).
The Homeowner was required to marshal the evidence contained in
Uhrhahn's Closing Brief. First, the Trial Court specifically incorporated
Uhrhahn Construction's brief in its Memorandum Decision, which states:
[T]he Court notes that the factual overview and legal
arguments presented in [Uhrhahn Construction's]
Closing Argument Brief are generally consistent with
this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10).
Second, Utah Supreme Court precedent is on point. In Knickerbocker
the appellant challenged the trial court's findings of fact as being erroneous
since it included no specific findings as to an insurance company's
requirements for changing beneficiaries. Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 979.
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The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding t h a t because the
record contained a copy of the insurance policy stating those requirements,
the trial court was not obligated to restate t h e m in its findings of fact in
order to reach its ultimate conclusion. Id. Specifically, the court observed:
The record includes a copy of the . . . policy stating
the r e q u i r e m e n t s for changing beneficiaries. The
trial court w a s not obligated to restate t h e m in its
findings in order to conclude t h a t [the policyholder]
h a d substantially complied with t h e m . The trial
court is not required to recite each indicia of
reasoning t h a t leads to its conclusions, nor is it
required to m a r s h a l the evidence in support of
them.
Id.
The Trial Court in this case went even further t h a n did the trial court
in Knickerbocker.

Not only was a copy of U h r h a h n ' s Closing Brief in the

record, the Trial Court J u d g e specifically stated in her Memorandum
Decision t h a t her findings were consistent with U h r h a h n ' s Closing Brief.
Thus, there were more t h a n sufficient findings of fact on the contractual
issues that the Homeowner was required to m a r s h a l ; b e c a u s e he failed to
do so, the Court should a s s u m e the validity of those findings.
B.

The Trial Court Entered Sufficient Findings Regarding the
Principal Amount of Damages Owing t o Uhrhahn Construction

The Trial Court found t h a t U h r h a h n Construction provided clear and
credible evidence establishing the a m o u n t of his damages. To the contrary,
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the Homeowner provided nothing in support of its damage claims. Again,
the Homeowner h a s failed to m a r s h a l the evidence u p o n which the Trial
Court relied in determining the principal a m o u n t of damages awarded to
U h r h a h n Construction.
The damages calculation is detailed in U h r h a h n ' s Closing Brief,
including citations to the evidence u p o n which the Trial Court relied. (R.
146-150). That calculation is reproduced here for the Court's convenience:
The original bid Proposals add u p to $74,023.00. In addition,
U h r h a h n Construction is entitled to recover for additional work
completed.
1.

Invoices
$100,645.22

2.

The invoices in the Cost Review Analysis
represent
the
work
Uhrhahn
Construction completed and for which
the Homeowner was billed.

E x t r a s / C h a n g e Order
8,161.99

The original invoice for Durisol Block was
billed at $27,905.00, which was
approximately $8,500.00 above the
original bid, b u t w a s based on Mr.
Hopkins' misrepresentations. The Cost
Review Analysis evidenced it cost even
more to install the Durisol Block. Once
Mr. U h r h a h n did the figures, instead of
the invoice being $27,905.00, it should
have been $36,066.99, leaving a
difference
from
t h a t invoice of
$8,161.99.
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1,457.09

The footings and Change Order came to
$10,115.30. After Mr. U h r h a h n ' s review
of the time sheets a n d material receipts
in preparation to complete the requested
Cost Review A n a l y s i s ,
Uhrhahn
Construction truly h a d a cost of
$11,572.09, which results in an
additional $1,457.09 for all footing work
completed.

900.00

This a m o u n t relates to the steel angles
over windows necessitated by the Durisol
Block which included a n installation
charge. U h r h a h n Construction originally
bid the windows to have rebar a s shown
in the Durisol m a n u a l . However, this
was not workable, requiring the extra
work. This n u m b e r also deals with the
rough framing of the sub-floor. After a
review of U h r h a h n Construction's time
sheets, there were four additional h o u r s
plus superintendent h o u r s . The time
sheet cost resulted in an additional
charge of $900.00 on the rough framing
of the sub-floor.

1,712.50

This item r e l a t e s to back-fill a n d t h e
construction of a retaining wall, as well
as other miscellaneous earthwork. The
Invoices for this work totaled $4,350.00.
However, based u p o n Mr. U h r h a h n ' s
review of the time s h e e t s and equipment
rates, the total should have been
$6,062.50, leaving a difference of
$1,712.50.

$ 12,231.58

Total for E x t r a s / C h a n g e Order
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3.

Credits
157.50

6.03

$
4.

163.53

Foundation and footing items were billed
at $8,294.93. After Mr. Uhrhahn's
review of the time sheets and materials
receipt, Uhrhahn Construction had a
cost of $8,137.43, giving the Homeowner
a credit of $157.50.
The original bid proposal for concrete
slabs was $12,670.00. In addition, there
was a concrete price increase of
$172.53.
However,
Uhrhahn
Construction had to use fewer yards
than originally bid for, reducing the
amount actually owing on this item
below the original bid proposal, even
after the price increase, thus giving the
Homeowner a credit of $6.03.
Total for

Summary
$100,645.22
12,231.58

Invoices
Extras

$112,876.80
163.53

Credits

$112,713.27

Total amount of construction based
upon Mr. Hopkins' misrepresentations,
as well as written and verbal
agreements, and evidenced in the Cost
Review Analysis.

$ 2,603.43

Lien filed against Uhrhahn Construction
by Butterfield Lumber for supplies Mr.
Hopkins purchased and charged to
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U h r h a h n Construction's account without
permission. U h r h a h n Construction paid
to release the lien.
$115,316.70

Subtotal of construction plus satisfied
lien.

- $ 47,882.22

Amount
the
H o m e o w n e r p a i d to
U h r h a h n Construction.

$ 67,434.38

Total a m o u n t of d a m a g e s

In addition, Mr. U h r h a h n agreed at trial to reduce the damage claim
as follows:

Total:

$ 668.00

Credit for electrical work

$ 1457.09

Credit for footing work

$ 65,306.29

($67,434.38

minus

$

668, minus

$1457.09).
The Trial Court permitted an offset to the total damage figure in the
a m o u n t of $2,920.00 b a s e d on the testimony of framer Matt Collett who
testified this w a s a n additional cost to the Homeowner to get the framing to
m a t c h the block work. Accordingly, after subtracting the offset, the Court
found t h a t U h r h a h n Construction established principal d a m a g e s in the
a m o u n t of $ 6 2 . 3 8 6 , 2 9 ,

Because the Homeowner failed to m a r s h a l the

evidence on the principal a m o u n t of damages, the facts u p o n which the
Trial Court relied should be p r e s u m e d valid.
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C.

The Trial Court's Findings That the Homeowner Failed to
Provide Support For His Alleged Damages Should Be
Presumed Valid

Even if the Homeowner would have succeeded on his contractual
arguments, he failed to establish damages at trial.

The Homeowner

presented not a shred of evidence to show he suffered damages as a result
of any alleged breach of contract. In fact, the only evidence the Homeowner
presented other than his bare assertions that he incurred damages, was a
set of conflicting damage summaries he prepared for trial, which the Court
found were not credible. Moreover, the Homeowner did not produce a
single witness or a single cancelled check to prove damages, other than the
offset for Matt Collett's work as discussed above.
D.

The Homeowner Should Not Be Permitted to Marshal the
Evidence in His Reply Brief

The Homeowner should not be permitted to remedy his error by going
through the marshaling process in his reply brief. The Utah Supreme Court
has condemned such attempts, declining to consider an appellant's
evidentiary challenges where it failed to marshal the evidence until the reply
brief. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2002 UT 112, H 40, 61 P.3d
1053 (eleventh-hour attempt to marshal evidence in reply brief is too late).
The court further observed:
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An appellant seeking to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a finding fact m u s t
u n d e r t a k e a n d meet the heavy marshaling b u r d e n
in its opening m e m o r a n d u m of law on appeal. An
appellant c a n n o t . . . wait to m a r s h a l the evidence in
its reply brief.
Id. at If 4 1 . Therefore, a n attempt on the part of the Homeowner to m a r s h a l
the evidence in his reply brief should be rejected.
II.

BASED ON THE VALID FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE
TRIAL COURT RELIED, THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION
REGARDING UHRHAHN CONSTRUCTION'S RIGHT TO RECOVER
UNDER CONTRACTUAL THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 3
U h r h a h n Construction marshaled the evidence in the fact section out

of a n a b u n d a n c e of caution. Those facts support t h e Trial Court's legal
conclusion t h a t U h r h a h n Construction established the existence of both
express and implied contracts u n d e r the Mechanics' Lien Act ("the Act").
Despite the Homeowner's argument, j u s t b e c a u s e there were written bid
proposals, does not m e a n those could not be modified a n d / o r supplemented
by implied agreements. See Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 1999 UT App
217, Tf 11, 982 p.2d 94 (rejecting argument t h a t only written agreements
can modify written contract, where s t a n d a r d principals of contract

3

The Trial Court's "Memorandum Decision" references Uhrhahn's Closing
Brief in support of her legal conclusions. The legal analysis is taken from that
briefing. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf, pp. 9-13; R. 137-146).
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construction permit parties to modify written contract based on conduct or
oral agreement).
Moreover, the Act specifically provides for recovery based on both
express and implied contracts. Specifically, § 38-1-2 of the Act defines
"subcontractors" and "original contractors" based upon the contracts under
which they provide services:
Any person who does work or furnishes materials by
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as
provided in this chapter, shall be considered an
original contractor, and all other persons doing work
or furnishing materials shall be considered
subcontractors.
U.C.A. § 38-1-2 (emphasis added).
This Court's analysis in the case of Gary Porter Construction v. Fox
Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371 is directly on point. In
that case, the defendant general contractor entered into a subcontract with
the plaintiff to perform various excavation and soil placement services for
a specific sum. Id. at Tf 3. After work on the project began, the contractor
requested the subcontractor to perform additional work not included in the
subcontract or the original bid. Id.
At times the contractor verbally acknowledged that the subcontractor
was providing services outside the contract, and up until a certain time, the
contractor paid for all work done by the subcontractor, whether or not it
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was included in the written contract. Id. at If 4. However, the contractor
quit paying after n u m e r o u s disputes arose between the parties.

Id.

Therefore, the subcontractor filed suit against the contractor alleging
various contractual theories based on a n implied contract, despite the
existence of a written contract. Id. at ^ 6.
The trial court granted the subcontractor s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t and this
Court affirmed, holding t h a t a n implied contract existed. Id. at *§ 7 & f 22.
In affirming

the trial court's ruling t h a t the contractor owed

the

subcontractor additional compensation for work performed outside the
written contract, this Court noted that the subcontractor h a d successfully
satisfied the elements necessary to establish an implied in fact contract,
including:
(1)
[the contractor] requested [the subcontractor]
to perform the work u n d e r the Excluded Sections,
(2) [the subcontractor] expected
additional
compensation from [the contractor] for the work,
a n d (3) [the contractor] knew or should have known
t h a t [the subcontractor] expected
additional
compensation.
Id. at^f 17. In satisfaction of the elements, the subcontractor presented
evidence

showing

that

at

times the

contractor

acknowledged

the

subcontractor w a s providing extras, and for several m o n t h s the contractor
reviewed and paid itemized bills from the subcontractor for work provided
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outside of the contract. Id. at Tf 18. Based on such evidence, this Court
held that an implied contract existed and the contractor knew or should
have known that the subcontractor expected to be paid for work he did
outside of the written contract. Id. at f 21.
A.

Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work under Express
Contracts

Uhrhahn Construction completed substantial work under the written
proposals. The work Uhrhahn Construction completed pursuant to the
proposals was clearly established at trial through Mr. Uhrhahn's testimony
and the documents contained in the Cost Review Analysis. (R. 164-187).
The portions of the framing, electrical and plumbing Uhrhahn Construction
did not complete, which were in the proposals, was based on agreement and
Uhrhahn Construction did not bill the Homeowner for the unfinished
portions.
B.

Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work Pursuant to Implied
Agreements

As in Gary Porter Construction, the Trial Court found that Uhrhahn
Construction performed services for the Homeowner outside of the written
bid proposals. Mr. Uhrhahn sent Mr. Hopkins multiple itemized invoices
outlining the additional work, and the Homeowner paid for that additional
work. The extra work Uhrhahn Construction completed outside of the bid
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proposals for which the Homeowner paid include: extra footings, hand
excavation, extra power and water pump costs, increased concrete costs,
extra water and sewer services and several other miscellaneous extras. In
addition, the Homeowner owed Uhrhahn Construction additional sums for
the

installation

of

misrepresentations.

the

Durisol

block

because

of

Mr.

Hopkins'

Mr. Uhrhahn, Rich Dorney and Robert Hille all

testified that the block was deformed, a fact Mr. Hopkins failed to disclose
to Mr. Uhrhahn before he bid the job.
After paying for work Uhrhahn Construction completed outside of the
written proposals, Mr. Hopkins quit paying for the work after disputes arose
over the Durisol block. Therefore, based on the evidence Plaintiff presented
at trial regarding the course of dealings between Mr. Uhrhahn and Mr.
Hopkins, which practically mirrors the course of dealings between the
contractor and subcontractor in Gary Porter Construction, the Trial Court
found that Uhrhahn Construction satisfied the requisite elements to
establish an implied in fact contract and to further establish that Mr.
Hopkins knew or should have known that Mr. Uhrhahn expected payment
for extras he provided outside of the bid proposals.
The only evidence Mr. Hopkins presented in rebuttal was his own
unsupported testimony. Despite his acceptance of additional services and
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payment therefore, t h e Homeowner argued at trial, with absolutely no
support, t h a t there were no modifications to t h e bid proposals a n d t h a t he
is not obligated to pay for any of the extras U h r h a h n

Construction

completed t h a t were n o t included in those proposals. Therefore, the Trial
Court's legal conclusions regarding the contractual elements of the
mechanics' lien claim should be affirmed.
III.

REMAND IS APPROPRIATE REGARDING THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ACT
Uhrhahn

Construction

concedes t h a t the findings of fact are

insufficient regarding the jurisdictional requirements of § 38-1-11 (requiring
claim for foreclosure of lien to be filed 180 days from last labor or services
performed or last material provided) . 4 The undersigned counsel believed the
facts supportive of jurisdiction were contained in U h r h a h n ' s Closing Brief.
However, u p o n a close reading of that brief, a s well a s the Court's
"Memorandum Decision" a n d "Findings of Fact a n d Conclusions of Law,"
counsel agrees t h a t t h e facts regarding jurisdiction are not included so as
to allow meaningful

review of the findings.

Therefore,

Uhrhahn

Construction concedes t h a t t h e Trial Court's findings on t h a t issue are
4

On the second day of trial, the Homeowner moved to dismiss Uhrhahn
Construction's claim for foreclosure on the mechanics' lien, arguing it was not
timely filed. Uhrhahn Construction opposed based on a statute of limitations
argument, but concedes after subsequent reading of case law that the time limit
in this case is jurisdictional.
-31-

clearly erroneous a n d therefore, r e m a n d for further

proceedings is

appropriate a s to this issue only. See Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 2 3 3 , 236
(Utah 1983) (failure to m a k e findings on all material issues requires
remand). Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorneys fees and
costs to U h r h a h n Construction u n d e r U.C.A. § 38-1-18 likewise cannot be
determined prior to r e m a n d since t h a t claim succeeds only if jurisdiction is
proper.
Because J u d g e Leslie Lewis is no longer on t h e bench, U h r h a h n
Construction

respectfully

suggests

that

remand

specifically

for

an

evidentiary hearing before a new judge would be appropriate requiring the
parties to point to all evidence presented at trial t h a t may go to the
jurisdictional issue.

This would further judicial efficiency

because

otherwise, a new judge would have the onerous t a s k of pouring through the
entire trial transcript, a s well as all trial exhibits.
IV.

PLAINTIFF PROPERLY FILED AN ALTERNATE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR COLLECTION OF A DEBT
Even if U h r h a h n Construction h a d not complied with the Act, it

would still be entitled to recover for the debt the Homeowner owes. In fact,
the Act itself specifically states t h a t such recovery is not precluded,
providing:
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(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair
or affect the right of any person to whom a debt may
be due for any work done or materials furnished to
maintain a personal action to recover the same.
U.C.A. § 38-1-11(3). Pursuant to subsection (3), Uhrhahn Construction was
entitled to, and did, file a separate action for a debt the Homeowner owes
for services and material. See also Motivated Mgmt Int'l v. Finney, 604 P.2d
467, 468 (Utah 1979); Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United
World Travel Assoc, Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979). Based on the
same evidence presented in support of Uhrhahn Construction's claims
under the Act, the Trial Court found that Uhrhahn Construction is entitled
to recover the debt the Homeowner owes.
V.

THE HOMEOWNER PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Even if the written bid proposals constituted the only contract at

issue, to the extent Uhrhahn Construction deviated from the contract, such
deviation was justified based on Mr. Hopkins'misrepresentations, therefore
rendering the contract voidable. Well established contract law provides that
a contract is voidable if 1) there is a misrepresentation; 2) the
misrepresentation is either fraudulent or material; 3) the misrepresentation
induced the recipients to make the contract; and, 4) the recipient was
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justified in relying on the misrepresentation. Miller v. Celebration Mining
Co., 2001 UT 64, Tf 10, 29 P.3d 1231 (citation omitted).
The Trial Court found that Uhrhahn Construction satisfied each
element necessary to show the contract (to the extent there was even a sum
certain contract in the first place) was voidable and that Mr. Uhrhahn was
therefore justified in refusing to continue working under the written terms
of the proposals. First, Mr. Hopkins made misrepresentations, specifically
with regard to the Durisol block, stating to Mr. Uhrhahn that it would take
only Vz the time to install as cinder block. Not only did the block fail to go
swiftly as Mr. Hopkins represented, the block Mr. Hopkins purchased was
seriously deformed, causing additional difficulties with installation. The
evidence identified above clearly defeats the Homeowner's arguments on
this point.
Second, the misrepresentations were "material" because they directly
impacted the amount Uhrhahn Construction bid for the job. Third, Mr.
Hopkins' misrepresentations induced Mr. Uhrhahn to enter into the
contract, not only because he would get the job for the block work, but
doing the block work also meant he would get the job for the rough framing.
Finally, the Trial Court properly concluded that Uhrhahn Construction
satisfied the last element to establish the contract was voidable because Mr.
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Uhrhahn was justified in relying on the misrepresentations. Mr. Uhrhahn
had never installed Durisol block, but had extensive experience in cinder
block masonry; he informed Mr. Hopkins of this. Mr. Hopkins told Mr.
Uhrhahn Durisol was an improvement over cinder block and even easier to
install. Mr. Hopkins also provided some written material on Durisol block.
Thus, Mr. Uhrhahn had no reason to believe Mr. Hopkins did not know
what he was talking about or was otherwise misleading Mr. Uhrhahn. Mr.
Uhrhahn was therefore justified in relying on Mr. Hopkins' representations.
Because Uhrhahn Construction satisfies the requisite elements, even if the
proposals constituted a contract, that contract was appropriately voided.
VI.

THE COURT'S RULING DENYING THE HOMEOWNER'S WRONGFUL
LIEN CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
As discussed in the controlling statutes section above, although the

Homeowner's Notice of Appeal states it is an appeal from the entire
judgment, the Homeowner's Brief does not address his Counterclaim and
Third-party wrongful lien claim. Because the Homeowner's statement of
issues and subsequent arguments fail to address that claim, the Trial
Court's ruling on the wrongful lien Counterclaim and Third-party claim
should be affirmed. See Snow Flower, 2001 UT App 207, f 14, 31 P.3d 576
(citation omitted) ("This court has routinely declined to consider arguments
which are not adequately briefed on appeal.").
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court should be affirmed on every
ruling with the exception of the jurisdictional issue, which is appropriate for
remand.

The Trial Court entered ample findings of fact regarding the

contractual issues underlying Uhrhahn Construction's claims, and the
Homeowner's Counterclaim for breach of contract. The Trial Court also
found extensive factual evidence supporting the principal amount of
damages. The Homeowner was required to marshal that evidence, but
failed to do so. Therefore, the findings of fact as to the contractual issues
and principal amount of damages should be presumed valid. The Trial
Court's legal rulings following from those facts were also proper. Finally,
the Trial Court's rejection of the Homeowner's wrongful lien claim should
stand.
Therefore, Uhrhahn Construction respectfully requests this Court to
affirm the trial Court on all rulings with the exception of the jurisdictional
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rulings and attorneys fee award following therefrom.

A remand for an

evidentiary hearing for those rulings would be appropriate.
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